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ABSTRACT: Many French-speaking approaches to argumentation are deeply rooted in a linguistic
background. Hence, they "naturally" tend to adopt a descriptive stance on argumentation. This is the
reason why the issue of "the virtues of argumentation" – and, specifically, the question of what makes
an argument virtuous – is not central to them. The argumentative norms issue nevertheless cannot
be discarded, as it obviously is crucial to arguers themselves: the latter often behave as if they were
invested with some kind of argumentative policing duty when involved in dissensual exchanges. We
propose to account for a number of researches developing a descriptive approach to such an
ordinary argumentative police: we claim that the virtues of argumentation may be an issue even for
an amoral analyst. We will connect this issue with linguistic remarks on the lexicon of refutation in
English and in French.
KEYWORDS: argumentative practice, descriptive approach, meta-discourse, norms

1. NORMATIVE VERSUS DESCRIPTIVE PERSPECTIVE
In some way, the research orientation presented is this paper is quite representative
of a trend in French-speaking argumentation studies – even if the phrase "a trend in
French-speaking argumentation studies" sounds a little bit too ambitious for the
reality it refers to.1
The approaches I am referring to are descriptive; they aim at analyzing the
discursive and interactional mechanisms involved in argumentative discussions, but
they are little – if at all – committed in assessing the argumentative devices thus
identified.
This preference for a descriptive stance on argumentation is characteristic of
scholars in argumentation studies originating from the field of linguistics, rhetoric,
or from that of French discourse analysis (Amossy, 2009, 2012). Such scholars by
and large adhere to Plantin’s claim according to whom there is nothing like a
linguistic marker of the truth or soundness of a discourse, any more than there are
markers of proper or beautiful discourse: "Il n’y a pas plus de marqueur linguistique
I prefer "French-speaking approaches" to "French approaches" insofar as the researches I am
referring to are developed in France, but also in Belgium, in Switzerland, or in Israel; the number of
French-speaking scholars the research of whom is essentially focused on argumentation may be
estimated at about 20 people.
1
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du discours vrai que de marqueurs linguistiques du bon ou du beau discours",
writes Plantin (2002, p. 237).
Beyond contrasting disciplinary anchorages, there also may be deeper
cultural reasons for this theoretical divide of argumentation studies into normative
versus descriptive approaches.
This cultural hypothesis may be supported by an observation I made when
beginning to work on my paper for the 2013 OSSA conference on "The virtues of
Argumentation".
2. "VIRTUOUS ARGUMENT"  "ARGUMENT VERTUEUX"
As any conscientious participant to the 10th OSSA conference, my first concern when
preparing my talk was to fit its theme, "Virtues of argumentation". It did not seem
obvious to me how the phrase "Virtues of argumentation" should be understood. As
a result of linguistic scruples due to my non-native speaker status, I took the title
"Virtues of argumentation" not in the general sense of "the benefits that one can
expect from the practice of argumentation", but in the restricted sense of "what
makes an argument virtuous". Even understood that way, I still had to face a
hesitation which was due partly to a conceptual uncertainty, and partly to a feeling
of linguistic insecurity: does the phrase "the virtues of argumentation" mean the
same thing as French "les vertus de l’argumentation"? The way I proceeded to
handle this question was to turn to a Google search to have a look at the uses of the
phrases "virtuous argument" and "argument vertueux" in context. What came out
was a spectacular divergence between the uses of the French phrase "argument
vertueux" and that of the English corresponding phrase "virtuous argument".
As a result of this Google search, the phrase "virtuous argument" seems to
appear in casual contexts as well as in scientific settings. It is used by ordinary
speakers (if anything such as an ordinary speaker ever exists) as well as by experts,
or semi-experts, in rhetoric or argumentation studies. The following semantic
considerations are drawn from the instances found on the Internet.2
The meaning which is associated to the phrase "virtuous argument" is by and
large stable. It refers to an argument that is acceptable,3 from a moral point of view,
but also in a much broader sense. A "virtuous argument" is ethical in the sense that
it is grounded in virtues such as sincerity, honesty, and accountability (through the
support-giving requirement attached to it). It is respectful of the opponent and of
the audience and shows open-mindedness, tolerance and generosity, for it requires
the arguer to consider alternative points of view.4 A "virtuous argument" also
complies with the rules which warrant the validity of an argument. If favors the
respect of principles rather than the achievement of persuasive objectives. A

The footnote references to specific texts found on the Internet are meant to illustrate the meaning
attached to "virtuous argument" identified owing to a much broader research.
2
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"virtuous argument" is "faithful to the ideals" of the speakers,5 at the risk of
unrealism,6 it is based on the speaker’s humanity, or on "righteous reasons".7 It may
be inspired by religion,8 as well as by mundane principles.
"Virtuous argument" is opposed to "vicious argument", that is, an argument
which is deemed purely instrumental, for which the end justifies the means; a
vicious argument is "interest driven".9 Non-virtuous arguments may be "vile,"
"misogynistic" and "repulsive"; they pertain toxic rhetoric.10
These are the main semantic elements resulting from a survey of the results
of a Google search with the phrase "virtuous argument" as a keyword.
By contrast, the French expression "argument vertueux" turns out to be almost
always used in a distanced and even anti-phrastic, ironic way. Example 1 is typical of
such a use of "argument vertueux". It is drawn from the website of the French
newspaper Le Figaro, and it announces that in England the 3D technology is being
used to broadcast operas such as Carmen or Lucrezia Borgia in selected cinemas or
on TV channels. The comment by the author of the paper on the communication
surrounding this innovation runs as follows:
Example (1)
Pour camoufler le caractère lucratif de la démarche (qui n’a rien de
choquant, au contraire), on nous ressert le même argument vertueux :
encourager ceux qui, terrorisés, n’ont jamais mis les pieds dans une salle
d’opéra, à franchir le pas.11
In order to conceal the lucrative dimension of the project (whereas it
is by no way shocking, on the contrary), we are served up again the
same virtuous argument: it is a way of encouraging those who,
terrified, have never set foot in an opera hall to make the leap.
In this example, the expression "virtuous argument" paradoxically refers to an
argument which is subject to a negative assessment – it is paradoxical, since
"virtuous" is linguistically endowed with a positive assessment. The way the
"virtuous argument" is introduced in this example ("we are served up again the
same virtuous argument") views it as a well-worn, poorly conclusive argument.
Besides, the so-called "virtuous argument" is deceptive, in that it is intended to
Steven, Nothing but the Truth. Why trial lawyers don’t, can’t, and shouldn’t have to tell the whole
truth. http://books.google.fr
5
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conceal the real motives of the speaker, which have to do with financial issues. Thus,
despite the clearly negative assessment attached to the phrasing of the argument,
the adjective "virtuous" is used, which clearly has a positive orientation. This
antiphrastic use of "virtuous" serves the denunciation of an ethotic strategy led by
the speaker: the argument put forward to support the 3D broadcast of operas is
used for its consensus-generating potential and its ethotic dimension. It makes the
arguer appear anxious to provide culturally deprived people with an access to highvalued cultural goods. In that, it promotes a well-wishing, solidarity-oriented
attitude that can meet nothing but agreement – one can hardly oppose the use of 3D
broadcast of operas claiming that opera is, and should remain, restricted to an elite
sophisticated enough to appreciate it at its real value. The so-called virtuous
argument is thus discarded as purely strategic and insincere.
I will confine myself to this example to illustrate the use of the French
expression ‘argument vertueux’ that seems to prevail, but it is far from being an
isolated atypical example.
To sum up the certainly too hasty impressions conveyed by this cursory
investigation of the "virtuous argument" / ‘argument vertueux’ phrases, it seems
that in an Anglo-American context, people have no problem with qualifying an
argument as virtuous, based on a set of backing principles or values which can be
made more or less explicit. In contrast, in a French-speaking context, an argument
can hardly be thought of as genuinely virtuous, without seeing in the displayed
virtue a mere strategy aiming at prompting consensus on the thesis under
discussion, and at attracting sympathy onto the arguer: a virtuous argument is a
façade argument used to make the arguer himself appear virtuous.
3. ARISTOTLE’S LOGICS / ARISTOTLE’S RHETORICS
This contrasting approach to "virtuous argument" may be connected with
contrasting traditions in argumentation studies. Most of the scholars the research of
whom is rooted in Aristotle’s Dialectics and Logics are English-speaking (whether
they are native speakers or not, their research is mainly conducted in English). They
develop an approach that handles arguments as sets of propositions structured
along identifiable logical patterns. The evaluation of arguments requires that,
beyond the identification of the logical pattern they show, further parameters be
taken into account; these additional parameters allow to handle characteristics of
the context (Blair, 2004) or interactional specifications.
In contrast, most of French-speaking approaches to argumentation – and in
particular, the approach I myself develop –come under two traditions. First, as
mentioned before, some of them adopt a linguistic perspective. They may consider
argumentative discourse as characterized by a specific regime of transphrastic
coherence and come under a textual linguistics approach (here I thing mainly of
Jean-Michel Adam’s work on argumentation ; cf. Adam, 2004);12 some others, mainly
inspired by Oswald Ducrot’s research, claim that argumentative meaning is
12
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constrained by the linguistic system (Ducrot, 1995; Anscombre & Ducrot, 1983;
Carel, 2010). Typically, such a linguistic perspective on argumentation focuses on
the way the use of argumentative connectors or the choice of lexical items prepares
an utterance to support some conclusions over others by selecting specific semantic
topoï. Such a view of argumentation cannot make sense of the notion of virtuous
argumentation insofar as a linguistic approach is not designed to handle evaluative
issues.
Other approaches that were inspiring to me, and which may highlight the
preference for a strategic and somewhat cynical interpretation of French "argument
vertueux", are tied up with the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition (see for instance
Amossy, 2009, 2012; Declercq, 1992). They consider argumentation as a social
activity that can be investigated only in connection to a specific context
characterized by specific stakes, animated by actors pursuing goals and using
various means, among which, verbal means, to achieve these goals. In such a
perspective, the issue of the virtues of argumentation is seen through strategic
glasses: an argument which displays respect for some principles or values is seen
less as reflecting the arguers’ sincere concern with producing a virtuous argument
than as a means to enhance the persuasive potential of one’s discourse through
producing an ethos of bona fide that is favorable to the speaker.
This opposition between essentially normative English-speaking approaches
to argumentation, and essentially descriptive French-speaking ones, is not as clearcut as the previous presentation suggests. Some French scholars adopt a normative
stance on argumentation (see for instance Dufour, 2008, Breton, 1996); conversely,
a growing number of English-speaking scholars pay a sustained attention to the
discursive and interactional dimension of argumentation; I think of course of Jacobs
and Jackson’s seminal work on face-to-face argumentation (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980,
Jacobs, 1987), but also of the Pragma-dialectic model, some of the recent
developments of which focus on the practice of argumentation (see for instance
Eemeren & Houtlosser (Eds.), 2005). Nevertheless, these approaches to
argumentation, while showing an important descriptive and analytical concern,
simultaneously advocate a normative and prescriptive stance which is largely
absent from the French-speaking trend I am referring to.13
4. A DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH TO ARGUMENTATIVE NORMS
In brief, maybe as a consequence of this double linguistic and rhetorical background,
normative approaches to argumentation, that is, approaches aiming at proposing
criteria for the assessment of argumentation, do not prevail in the francophone
research on argumentation, which may be characterized, as I suggested before, as
mainly descriptive (Amossy, 2009, p. 254). However, adopting a descriptive
It is well known as for the Pragma-dialectic model; it is also true for Jacobs and Jackson, who
advocate a normative pragmatics (see Jacobs & Jackson, 2000). It still holds for Gilbert’s theory of
“coalescent argumentation”; after emphasizing the need for a solid descriptive component of any
argumentation theory, Gilbert adds: “the elimination of violence as a response to disagreement is,
and must be, the final aim of all Argumentation Theory”(1997, p. 145).
13

5

MARIANNE DOURY
perspective on argumentation clearly does not entail that one has no concern for
argumentative norms. As Sally Jackson puts it, "A descriptive model pictures
argumentation as it occurs, not necessarily as it ought to occur. But it is important to
realize that a major part of any description will be a reconstruction of people’s own
normative ideas. That is, in order to adequately describe argumentative practice, we
must realize that people already have ideas about whether and how they are obliged
to defend their statements. " (1989, p. 113)
The point made by Sally Jackson, and also advocated by Robert Craig (1996),
Goodwin (2001) or Goldman (1994), meets some concerns expressed in France by
Christian Plantin.14 Since his early writings, Christian Plantin has been emphasizing
the need for exploring the spontaneous theories ordinary arguers rely on when
taking part in argumentative exchanges (Plantin, 1996, p. 16). A quick look on
argumentative practice makes it obvious that such spontaneous theories have a
normative component which helps the arguers to elaborate their case and to
evaluate their opponent’s argument according to some standards. The standards for
a "good" argument are more likely to be made explicit in agonistic contexts. In
peaceful interactions, where argumentation fulfills a heuristic, inquiry-like function,
the norms on which it rests often remain unstated.
As far as I am concerned, I am particularly interested in the issue of this
normative dimension of everyday argumentative competence. Most of my research
consists in exploring the critical activity led by speakers engaged in argumentative
exchanges. Such a perspective on argumentation defines a research program which
should address questions such as:
 When people dismiss the opponent’s argument as unacceptable, what norms
or principles do they resort to?
 What is the degree of generality of such norms or principles? Do they vary
according to the domain of knowledge the issue under discussion falls in? Are
they specific to a discursive genre (academic writings, political meetings,
conjugal arguments?) Are they typical of a cultural area or of a period in
history?
 Is the invocation of argumentative norms always subordinated to local
strategic objectives (a norm is invoked because it enables one to dismiss the
opponent’s argument which supports a conclusion the arguer disagrees
with)? Or does it sometimes reflect the ideal arguers should conform to,
whatever their momentary rhetorical interest?
 To what extent does taking these argumentative norms into account improve
the comprehension of the interactional dynamics of argumentative
exchanges? For instance, how do the critical questions associated with a
specific argument scheme structure the interactional sequence opened with
that kind of argument?
Note that Jackson as well as Craig, Goodwin or Goldman, through this attention paid to
argumentative practice and to its normative dimension, aim at contributing to its improvement; it is
not centrally the case for Plantin, nor, to my knowledge, for most of French-speaking descriptionoriented scholars in argumentation.
14
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 A last set of issues defined by a descriptive program dealing with
argumentative norms has to do with their linguistic expression: how are such
norms phrased? How are "good" or "bad" arguments qualified? How are they
named? How are they defined?
These questions outline some of the possible orientations of an anthropological
approach to argumentative norms that pays attention to the linguistic phrasing of
arguments as well as to their interactional dynamics.
Until now, I explored this issue of ordinary argumentative norms along two
ways.
5. ARGUMENT SCHEMES’ PHRASING AND CRITICS
One way consists in analyzing how a specific argument scheme is used, phrased and
criticized in a specific debate. The notion of critical questions as defined for instance
by Douglas Walton (Walton & Godden, 2005) or by the pragma-dialectic theory
(Garssen, 2002) helps the analyst to identify and classify the refuting moves that
may arise in relation to the use of a specific argument scheme. In return, the
observation of the refuting moves addressing this argument scheme in a specific
context may reveal local critical questions conditioning the acceptability of this
argument scheme (Doury, 1999a, 2005, 2006, 2009a).
For instance, I explored the way arguments from testimony run in many TV
debates on pseudo-sciences (like astrology, parapsychology, etc.; Doury, 1999b).
Apart from the usual critical questions addressed to check the reliability of any
testimony (Govier, 2001, pp. 145-147), the transcripts of TV debates on the subject
show that the fact that the witness looks like a nice guy, as well as the fact that he is
a run-of-the-mill person, with a run-of-the-mill life, are stated as arguments inviting
to trust a testimony.
The "nice face" criterion may be used by the host of a TV show as in the
following example, after two guests have recounted the out-of-body experience they
underwent:
Example (2)
Patrick Poivre D’Arvor: alors, vous y croyez, vous y croyez pas, ça
dépend, c'est vrai qu'ils ont une bonne tête.15
Patrick Poivre D’Arvor: believe them or not, at any rate they have a
nice face
Whatever its assessment with regard to rationality standards, I hold "at any rate
they have a nice face" to be an argument oriented to the "believe them" branch of
the conjunction ("believe them or not"); such an analysis permits to account for the
textual coherence of the sequence. Besides, whereas such an argument would
probably be deemed bluntly fallacious by most of the normative analysts, it is not
15
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deprived of all psychological relevance: there is no serious doubt that the physical
appearance of someone always influences to some extent the way the message he
delivers will be perceived. It is all the more the case for arguments from testimony,
which make the perception of the witness central to the acceptance of the claim.
This criterion gains even more weight in the context of a TV broadcast, known to
give a crucial importance to image issues.
The ‘out-of-the-mill’ argument is more specifically linked with what is being
testified for: testimonies about extraordinary events or facts seem to be deemed all
the more credible that they are reported by banal, ordinary witnesses. It may
explain why the host of the TV broadcast, when introducing the couple who
underwent an out-of-body experience, insists on the fact that until then, they had
ordinary people’s life:
Example (3)
Patrick Poivre D’Arvor: Alors il est évident que quand on fait ce genre
d'émission on essaye d'éviter les farfelus alors on a fait une petite
enquête de voisinage pour savoir si les gens qu'on recevait étaient
quand même convenables bon ceux-là ils le sont c'est ce qu'on nous dit
chez vous et effectivement quand on vous lit on s'aperçoit que vous avez
l'existence de monsieur tout le monde et de madame tout le monde
jusqu'au jour où vous étudiant à Lille dans votre chambre vous
pratiquez pour la première fois sans savoir de quoi il s'agissait un
dédoublement astral.16
Patrick Poivre D’Arvor: Well obviously when one prepares this kind of
program one tries to avoid eccentrics so we conducted a little inquiry
in their neighborhood in order to make sure that the people we
invited were at least respectable, well, those two are, that’s what
we’ve been told by your neighbours and in fact when one reads your
book, one realizes that you have an out-of-the-mill way of life until the
day when, while you were a student in Lille, in your room, you
experience for the first time, without having ever heard of that, an
astral split.
The ordinariness of witnesses is a recurring motive of arguments from testimony
concerning UFO apparitions, communication with the dead experiences and other
improbable matters of that kind; this motive is meant to increase the acceptability of
the testimonies under discussion.
This quick evocation of the way argument from testimony works in the
context of the debate on pseudo-sciences is meant to illustrate the fact that a close
attention paid to argumentation in various communication contexts, and
specifically, attention paid to the way objections elicited by a specific argumentative
scheme may be anticipated or answered, enables the analyst to identify which
critical questions are intrinsically attached to this argument scheme "in the
16
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abstract", and which are context-dependent.
6. THE LEXICON OF THE ORDINARY CRITICS OF ARGUMENTATION
The second main research orientation I have been exploring concerning ordinary
argumentative critical practice is more linguistic-oriented. It focuses on the very
words used by ordinary speakers to name and qualify argumentative phenomena. In
this sense, it parallels the research conducted for instance by Robert Craig (1999)
on what he calls "practical metadiscourse", and more specifically the exploration of
the "ordinary" use of words such as "argument", "argue" or "issue" by Robert Craig
(2011), Karen Tracy (Craig & Tracy, 2005), or Jean Goodwin (2007).
Such a focus on the ordinary meta-language of argumentation connects with
the question of argumentative norms in that it appears that most of the metaargumentative terms used by ordinary speakers have a normative dimension. It
seems that speakers engaged in an argumentative discussion rarely talk about
argumentation in general, or about specific argumentative processes, in a neutral
way. Thus, argumentative daily practice suggests that categorizing an argument as
displaying a specific argument scheme is usually nothing but a preamble to its
assessment – or even concomitant with it.
The exploration of argumentation meta-language is interesting in that it
provides an access to ordinary, spontaneous, practical, proto-, or whatever one calls
them, theories of argumentation.
My point is not to claim that spontaneous theories for argumentation would
be "better", more "true", more "accurate" than academic theories of argumentation.
It is rather that, beyond its anthropological interest, a good knowledge of ordinary
views of argumentation (including ordinary argumentative standards), combined
with a rigorous and systematic model of argumentation, might help one to gain in
accuracy when analyzing arguments.
Besides, the idea that there would be something like an ordinary theory of
argumentation, notably showing through ordinary meta-language of argumentation,
is a fiction, for at least two reasons.
First, as suggested by Craig (1996, p. 465), it would be wiser to speak of
sketches of theories, partial theories or even only of theoretical fragments: there is
no reason why arguers should elaborate on a systematic, complete, explicit theory of
argumentation. Much more probably do they resort to the theoretical modules that
serve their local argumentative purposes.
Second, there is no reason why this ordinary theoretical substratum should
be unified: as an element of the argumentative competence, it is plausibly
heterogeneous, and varies from one cultural sphere to another, from one
communication context or discursive genre to another, and even from one person to
another.
To illustrate this point, consider the following dialogue, which is too beautiful
to be true; I borrowed it from the Simpson’s cartoon. The episode is entitled "Homer
vs. Lisa and the 8th Commandment". In the episode, Homer gets an illegal cable
hook-up. His daughter Lisa radically disapproves of that: for her, it amounts to
stealing, and it is contrary to the 8th Commandment. Homer puts forward an
9
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argumentation in order to convince Lisa that if she considers using an illicit cable is
stealing, then she herself can be said to steal things on many occasions. The
argument runs as follows:
Example (4)
Lisa: Dad, why is the world such a cesspool of corruption?
Homer: [sotto voce] Oh, great... [speaking up] All right, what makes
you say that?
Lisa: Well, in Sunday School, we learned that stealing is a sin.
Homer: Well, DUH.
Lisa: But everybody does it. I mean, we're stealing cable as we speak.
Homer: Oh. Look at it this way, when you had breakfast this morning,
did you pay for it?
Lisa: No.
Homer: And did you pay for those clothes you're wearing?
Lisa: No, I didn't.
Homer: Well, run for the hills, Ma Barker! Before I call the Feds!
Lisa: Dad, I think that's pretty spurious.
Homer [looking flattered]: Well, thank you, honey.
The comical effect of this sequence is due to a double discrepancy between Homer’s
and Lisa’s communicative competences.
The first one has to do with an unequal distribution of lexical competence.
Clearly, ‘spurious’ does not enter Homer’s vocabulary – which may be deemed
somewhat rudimentary, whereas his daughter Lisa is an educated and very smart
person. Specifically, Homer’s "thank you, honey" signs the fact that he takes
"spurious" to be a positive assessing word. Note that the interpretation of Homer’s
"thank you" as being ironic is reasonably excluded by non-verbal indications:
Homer’s tone of voice is cheerful, and his face shows a high rate of self-satisfaction.
Although probably hearing the word spurious for the first time, he is
interpreting it as positively oriented in this specific context, and this has to do with a
second type of discrepancy, which concerns argumentative standards. Homer seems
to be very satisfied with the argument he has just put forward in order to discourage
Lisa’s virtuous drives, and he expects his daughter to echo his self-satisfaction:
hence he tends to interpret the word "spurious", which he does not know, as
laudatory. In contrast, the critical inquiry to which Lisa has submitted her father’s
argument concludes to a negative assessment of it ("Dad, I thing that’s pretty
spurious").
This example is quite typical of ordinary critics of argumentation, in that the
criterion according to which Homer’s argument has been negatively assessed
remains unstated. Maybe Lisa has categorized her father’s strategy as a tu quoque ad
hominem argument. Homer charges her with having committed the same crime as
the one she accuses him of; and she considers that the fact of charging her back with
theft is irrelevant to the question under discussion (should they renounce using the
illegal cable?). Maybe Lisa’s reluctance to accept her father’s line of argument is due
to the definition of "stealing" it relies on: for Homer, "stealing" equates with "using
10
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something you have not paid for", whereas Lisa might well consider that such a
definition is incorrect, for it would lead to qualify faultless behaviors as "thefts":
nothing, in the dialogue, tells us which line of assessment corresponds to Lisa’s
reasoning.
Second, the critical activity displayed by Lisa is typical of daily arguments in
that it cannot be isolated from strategic concerns. Lisa does not assess her father’s
argument from an exterior, neutral, disinterested perspective. She assesses it from
her locally involved perspective, in connection with her rhetorical objective, namely,
resisting her father’s attempt at benumbing her guilt feelings, and even convincing
him of not using the illicit cable. In this example, as it is the case most of the time,
argumentative criticism occurs because it serves refuting achievements. This
remark does not reflect a cynical perception of the use of argumentative norms in
ordinary discourse: Lisa might well be sincere and readily adhere to the standards
she invokes – and she even surely does (Lisa is a deeply virtuous person). My point
is only that in "real-life" examples, the critical assessment of argumentation must be
considered in the light of the participant’s rhetorical local objectives.
7. QUALIFYING ARGUMENTS
The research direction suggested by the Simpson example is certainly worth
pursuing. Identifying and analyzing the various evaluative adjectives, like "spurious"
in the dialogue, that may be attached to the word "argument" or "argumentation" is
a way of accessing ordinary argumentative norms.17
A quick survey in googlegroups discussion forums suggests that an argument
may be assessed in quite general terms. Typically, it may be deemed "good" or
"bad". The principles of assessment underlying some of the evaluative adjectives
associated with "argument" may echo standard evaluation criteria of argument.
Hence an argument may be deemed relevant or irrelevant, rational or irrational,
reasonable or unreasonable (and sometimes, "reasonably rational"), logical or
illogical, coherent or incoherent. After noting this superficial lexical convergence,
one should of course check to what extent these oppositions, which go through daily
argumentative discourses, conform to the way they are conceived of by
argumentation scholars.
Another way of assessing arguments in ordinary discourses focuses on the
effect it may have on the audience. When an argument is deemed "persuasive" or
"convincing", "strong", "acceptable", "seductive", the evaluation standard seems to
be the argument’s efficiency, its ability for making the audience adhere to the thesis
that it supports.
When the argument is said to be "civil", "fair", "honest", or "virtuous", the evaluation
rather rests on something like an ethics of communication.
Some qualifications of "argument" are much more unexpected. It is the case
Goodwin’s 2007 paper (“What, in practice, is an argument?”) develops a quantitative approach to
the discursive context in which the word “argument” appears, and specifically, to the adjectives that
may be associated to it, in the 1991 U.S. Congressional debate over initiating hostilities in the first
Gulf War.
17
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for instance for "boring": "your argument is boring", writes "God incorporated" in
alt.atheism. "Boring" clearly carries a negative viewpoint on the argument. It may
reflect a hedonist perspective on communication in general, and on argumentation
in particular: an argument should be phrased in such a way as to elicit the
audience’s interest and to provide it with pleasure. "Boring" may also refer to the
lack of novelty of the argument: an argument is boring when it is neither interesting
nor exciting because it is already known or heard or read. In both interpretations, a
boring argument violates the efficiency criterion: in order to be persuasive, one
must prevent the argument he carries from being boring.
A last example of how the evaluative adjectives associated with "argument"
suggest that ordinary critics of argumentation does not always follow the lines of
normative academic theories of argumentation, is the rich paradigm that opposes
"clever, smart, subtle" arguments to "dumb, silly, stupid" ones. No doubt that this
assessment paradigm is quite common; no doubt either that it illustrates an original
way of evaluating arguments with regard to usual academic normative perspectives
on argumentation. It also is certain that making this criterion systematic and
rigorous enough to make judgments such as "this argument is a smart one" or "this
argument is fricking retarded"18 intersubjectively decidable is a failure-destined
endeavor.
8. CATEGORIZING ARGUMENTS
The researches that I’ve been conducting on ordinary argumentative norms, when
centered on lexical indicators, have been centered on nouns rather than on
adjectives. They are based on the fact that, when interpreting the arguments they
are confronted to, ordinary speakers do no stick to their literal, local meaning, but
relate them to more general categories on the basis of the underlying abstract
pattern they have identified. Such general categories connect more or less directly
with classically identified argument schemes. Garssen’s 2002 paper entitled
"Understanding argument schemes" presents the results of experimental studies
that have proved the cognitive reality of such an ordinary argumentative
categorizing competence; he also shows that the distinction between the three main
families of argument –comparative, symptomatic, causal arguments – echo by and
large arguers’ categorizing and qualifying competence.
Garssen considers that an arguer has correctly identified the scheme an
argument belongs to when the strategies he uses to object to it fit the critical
questions associated with this scheme by a theoretical model – here, PragmaDialectics. Another complementary way of exploring the connection between
spontaneous categorizations of arguments and academic or scholarly ones, requires
once more that one pays attention to argumentation meta-language. What are the
terms that ordinary arguers use to name the arguments they carry, or the
arguments they are confronted with? Do these terms also belong to scholarly
terminology of argumentation studies? Are they defined the same way? Is their
18
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assessment the same?
The terms used to categorize an argument may, or may not, have an evaluative
dimension. For instance, an "example" or an "analogy" may be deemed "good" or
"poor"; therefore the use of the terms "example" or "analogy" to designate an
argument may be deemed neutral when not qualified. By contrast, certain terms
always convey a negative perspective on the argument they refer to: it is the case for
French word "amalgame", which refers to an argument based on a parallel between
two situations, persons or entities, on the basis of a connection which may be a
causal relationship, or a resemblance, or an inductive move from the particular to
the general. Whatever relationship it establishes, an "amalgame" is always deemed
"fallacious": the phrase "a good amalgame" is self-contradictory (Doury, 2005).
Other words are much more ambiguous as regards the evaluative perspective
they call for: this is the case for the word "pretext".
8.1. Pretext
‘Pretext’ is clearly a term belonging to the ordinary meta-language of
argumentation. A pretext is a justification one advances as a reason motivating an
action. A pretext may be put forward before the action has taken place; it then aims
at influencing the decision. It may also be put forward a posteriori; it then aims at
making the past decision appear legitimate.
The arguer who is said to be using a pretext for an action is portrayed as
carrying a means-end argumentation – an argumentation which obeys the following
pattern:
Measure M is designed to achieve end E.
End E is desirable
So,
Measure M must be adopted.
But the story does not end here: beyond this neutral semantic core, "pretext" also
often carries a judgment on the reason it designates. This judgment does not
concern the truth of the propositional content of the "pretext": the categorization of
an argument as a pretext does not mean that Premise 1 or 2 are being challenged,
nor does it mean that they do not support the conclusion. Categorizing an argument
as a "pretext" has to do with the sincerity issue: the problem lies within the fact that,
in the eyes of the speaker who calls an argument a "pretext", the arguer using the
so-called "pretext" does not pursue the achievement of end E, but rather that of
another end he wants to keep secret. Categorizing an argument as a pretext
amounts to view the situation as implying an internal reasoning determined by a
hidden agenda, and an externalized argumentation obeying a different end-means
scheme, as illustrated in figure 1:
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Externalized argumentation

Internal reasoning

1. Measure M is a means to achieve end E.
2. End E is desirable
So,
3. Measure M must be adopted.

1. Measure M is a means to achieve
end E’.
2. End E’ is desirable
So,
3. Measure M must be adopted

Figure 1
The meaning of "pretext" does not imply that the arguer’s real intentions are
shameful. Consider that I used the fact that my computer was out of order and that I
needed someone to fix it, in order to draw John in my apartment while his friends
were preparing a surprise birthday party in his own apartment. My displayed
intention is to have my computer fixed; my hidden agenda is to have John out of his
home; the beneficiary of the deception is John himself. In this specific case, it is
highly plausible that no negative judgment will be attached to the use of the word
"pretext", even if I was insincere when evoking my broken computer as my motive.
Only a rigid moralist would deem such a pretext reprehensible, because of the
dissimulation any pretext, by definition, entails.
However, in most of the cases, naming the reason given by an arguer "a
pretext" conveys a negative judgment, and appears in denunciatory discourses. This
negative judgment is shown by the semantic value of the phrase "a false pretext",
which can be met in the following examples:
Example (5)
Nuclear bombs are a false pretext for setting up the American public
to support a future war with Iran.19
Example (6)
The two girls know very well that this is a false pretext to lure them
into a "male trap".20
Example (7)
Moscow uses false pretext to wreck Georgia.21
Whereas a false friend is not a friend – and is even probably closer to an enemy, a
false pretext is not a good reason, but is a hyperbolic pretext. The adjunction of
"false" to ‘pretext’ emphasizes the dissimulation proper to it, and therefore clearly
orients to a negative assessment of the device.
19

http://www.youtube.com/all_comments?v=waMBt6EnsT8

20

http://sleimans.wordpress.com/page/3/

21
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The negative judgment attached to the use of "pretexts" seems to be elicited
by the contrast between the displayed reason, and the end which is really aimed at.
The displayed reason is meant to appeal consensus. This is why it often plays on the
addressee’s dearest values or feelings: when you portray a rapist has having evoked
a consuming thirst as a pretext in order to pity his victim into letting him in, you
suggest he took advantage of his victim’s kind heartedness.
When you suggest that the United States government used the 11th of
September as a pretext to restrain individual civil liberties and to increase his power
over American people,22 you accuse it of having deliberately exploited a traumatic
event associated with pain and fear in order to gain consensus on a liberticidal
measure.
In these examples, which I deem typical, the invocation of arguments as
externalized reasons for justifying an action is all the more open to criticism that
they exploit the audience’s feelings and values to serve one’s immoral ends.
What seems interesting to me is that, even if one considers that the
externalized argumentation is conclusive, the suspicion that the arguer has a hidden
agenda clearly downgrades the acceptability of the conclusion, whereas the
existence of a hidden agenda does not make the public means-end argument less
acceptable from a logical point of view. In such a case, ethical requirements clearly
overrule other assessment standards.
The use of the word "pretext" in argumentative ordinary meta-discourse
should be further investigated. In particular, the use of the phrase "a good pretext"
should be scrutinized; to what extent is a "good pretext" still a pretext at all? Is it an
efficient pretext, that is, a pretext that is plausible enough to deceive the addressee?
Or is it, on the contrary, a poorly deceptive pretext – that is, almost a reason?
Besides, the "pretext/excuse" pair should be examined. In this respect, a contrastive
approach would probably reveal interesting: both words "pretext" and "excuse"
exist in French ("prétexte" and "excuse"); but, at first sight, they don’t seem to have
the same distribution.
8.2 Linguistic resources
The last point of this paper concerns the interest of a focus on the linguistic
resources that a particular language offers to the speakers in order to label and
evaluate the arguments they use as well as the arguments they are confronted to.
When I initiated this part of my research, I investigated two French words
very common in argumentative discussions, and used by francophone speakers to
disqualify the opponent’s argument as being fallacious. The first one, that I have
already mentioned, is the term "amalgame". The second one is the term "procès
d’intention" (Doury, 2009b). My research was originally conducted in French, and
on French data; and I was very surprised when it became clear that, in both cases,
the translation into English was problematic indeed. Of course, it is possible to
explain what the argumentative moves designated by these terms consist of. As I
22
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suggested before, an "amalgame" may be described as a faulty parallel between two
situations, persons or entities, on the basis of a connection of various nature. A
"procès d’intention" may be described as the illegitimate rejection of the claim
supported by someone on the basis of the shameful motives which, supposedly,
founded the arguer in advancing it. Nevertheless, I consider as non trivial the fact
that a given language provides its practitioners with terms referring to some
specific argumentative moves – but not to others, and that it reflects a specific
attitude towards those moves. Intuitively – but no doubts this requires a more
serious reflection – I would say that it both reflects and encourages an increased
sensitivity to specific argumentative patterns, which may not fit exactly the expert
classical divisions into argument schemes.
Nevertheless, the perception, by the arguers, of a claim as belonging to a
recognizable argumentative scheme does not seem to depend on the existence, in
the arguers’ language, of an expression to name it – and I will close my paper with
the evocation of what arguers sometimes do when their own language does not
provide them with satisfactory terms to label the arguments they are confronted
with.
As it has been claimed by Eemeren & Meuffels (2002), the arguments that are
rejected as unacceptable by the arguers in everyday polemical interactions are often
of the ad hominem type. In France, the expression "ad hominem argument" is almost
never used to label such an argumentative device in daily discussions.23 Speakers
rather often resort to extended periphrases such as "you should discuss the facts,
and not criticize the persons. " They may also create original terminologies in order
to categorize argumentative schemes (Doury, 2006), as in Example 8. In a highly
polemical internet newsgroup, a participant accuses "Apokrif" of pretending to be
modest whereas he previously charged others of displaying such a false modesty.
Apokrif answers as follows:
Example (8)
Vous avez acheté un stock de céçuikidikiyé au prix de gros?
Did you buy a stock of "céçuikidikiyé" ["you are what you say I am"/ "I
know you are, but what am I?"] at wholesale price?
Apokrif accuses his opponent of constantly using an argument scheme that he labels
a "céçuikidikiyé"; "céçuikidikiyé" is a neologism issued from the oral form of the
juvenile expression "I know you are, but who am I?" (literally, "you are what you say
I am" [c’est celui qui dit qui est] "). It refers to a move that consists in reversing the
abusive designation one is addressed against the one who used it.24 Such a
designation disqualifies the opponent’s argumentation as childish; in that, it conveys
an additional criticism that the standard tu quoque designation would have missed.
Later on in the same newsgroup, another participant charges Apokrif with
The situation seems to be somewhat different in a North-American context, probably because
young American or Canadian people are much more familiarized with terms issued from critical
thinking throughout their educational training at school or at university.
23

24

It equates functionally the English “I’m rubber you’re glue".
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himself committing this faulty move. The accusation runs as follows:
Example (9)
hum… si le CTQDCTQÉ (ou le CPMCT, au choix) était une voiture, vous
seriez une Ferrari.
Hum… would the YATOWSYATOWI (or the ITSNMITSY, as you prefer)
were a car, you would be a Ferrari
After a dense reflection, and given what I knew of former exchanges, I hypothesized
that those acronyms should be understood as referring to French "C’est Toi Qui Dis
C’est Toi Qui Es" or English "You Are The One Who Says You Are The One Who Is"
for the first one, and "C’est Pas Moi, C’est Toi", or "IT’S Not Me, IT’S You" in the
second case.
9. CONCLUSION
These beautiful examples of ordinary arguers’ creativity applied to practical
evaluation of argumentation suggest that the argumentative norms that underlie
ordinary arguments deserve a sustained attention from scholars in argumentation.
One should pay attention to the content of such norms, to the way they are phrased
as well as to the way they are used in order to achieve local interactional and
communicative objectives. Last, a contrastive approach to argumentative norms,
aiming at exploring the linguistic specificities of the meta-argumentative lexicon in
various languages, seems to be a promising research orientation for a descriptive
approach to argumentative norms – or for an amoral analyst interested in the
virtues of argumentation.
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